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Abstract: Many theories of actual causation implicitly endorse the claim that if c is an actual 
cause of e, then either c causes e directly or every intermediary by which c indirectly causes e is 
itself both an actual cause of e and also an actual effect of c. We think this compositionality 
constraint is plausible. However, as we show, it is not always satisfied by the causal attributions 
ordinary people make. After showing that the compositionality constraint is not always satisfied 
by the causal attributions ordinary people make, we step back to consider what philosophers 
working on causation should do when the deliverances of their theories diverge from what 
ordinary people say. 
 
 
 
 
In this paper, we identify a structural constraint—the compositionality constraint—that is 
implicitly endorsed by many accounts of actual causation in the philosophical literature, and we 
present evidence suggesting that the causal attributions ordinary people make sometimes violate 
the compositionality constraint. In Section 1, we articulate the constraint and argue that many 
accounts of causation in the literature satisfy it. In Sections 2 and 3, we argue that there is reason 
to predict that ordinary causal attributions do not tend to respect the compositionality constraint 
in all cases, and we put our prediction to the test. Finally, in Section 4, we step back to reflect on 
the compositionality constraint, the goals of philosophical work on actual causation, and the 
implications of our results. 
 
1. Articulating the Compositionality Constraint 
Causation comes in at least two varieties—structural causation and actual causation. Structural 
causal relations are something like causal laws. They generate patterns of statistical association 
and underwrite the efficacy of interventions. By contrast, actual causation is about accounting for 
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things that have already happened: for attributing moral and legal responsibility, for explaining 
historical events, and for diagnosing complex systems.  
 Suppose that c, d, and e are events that actually occur. An initially plausible requirement 
on theories of actual causation is that they satisfy the following compositionality constraint: if c 
is an actual cause of e, then either c causes e directly or every intermediary d by which c 
indirectly causes e is itself an actual effect of c and an actual cause of e. To illustrate, suppose 
Hazel sets up a long chain of dominoes and then knocks them over by giving the first domino a 
flick. Hazel’s flick caused the first domino in the chain to fall directly, not by way of any 
intermediary. The first domino falling caused the second in the chain to fall and so on to the end 
of the chain. Actual causation may not be transitive, but in this case it seems that Hazel’s flick 
not only caused the first domino to fall, it also caused the last domino to fall. But Hazel’s flick 
did not directly cause the last domino to fall; rather, Hazel’s flick indirectly caused the last 
domino to fall by way of the other dominoes in the chain. The compositionality constraint says 
both that if Hazel’s flick actually caused the last domino to fall, then either the flick directly 
caused the last domino to fall or the flick indirectly caused the last domino to fall and also that if 
the flick indirectly caused the last domino to fall, then it actually caused (either directly or 
indirectly) some intermediary domino to fall and the intermediary domino falling actually caused 
(either directly or indirectly) the last domino to fall. 
 Many theories of actual causation entail the compositionality constraint. For example, 
consider a simple mark-transmission account in the spirit of Reichenbach (1956), where some 
event c is a cause of another event e iff c transmits a mark to e. Naively, an event c transmits a 
mark to another event e only if c exhibits a sign that is acquired by e and there is a (possibly 
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empty) sequence of events—all of which exhibit the sign—connecting c and e.1 When the 
sequence of events is empty, the transmission is direct in the sense of the compositionality 
constraint, and when the sequence is non-empty, the transmission is indirect. Now, if c causes e 
by way of a sequence of events, then c must transmit the mark to each of the events in the 
sequence in order to successfully transmit it to e. As such, the simple mark-transmission account 
entails the compositionality constraint. The conserved-quantity accounts of Salmon (1994, 1997) 
and Dowe (1995, 2000) make the notion of connection considerably clearer, but they retain the 
core idea here—and with it the compositionality constraint. 
 Ehring’s (1997) trope persistence theory takes a precise version of the compositionality 
constraint as a definition of causation. Ehring first defines a symmetric relation of strong causal 
connection in terms of the relations of identity, parthood, and lawful connection for tropes. In 
order to secure the asymmetry of causation, he adds a notion of causal priority, and then he 
defines causation as follows (2004, 73-74): 
 Trope P at t causes trope Q at t´ if (A) P at t is strongly causally connected to Q at t´ and  
 P at t is causally prior to Q at t´ [or] … (B) there is a set of properties (R1, …, Rn) such  
 that P is a cause of R1 under clause (A), …, and Rn is a cause of Q under clause (A). 
 
                                                 
1 We do not have a rigorous account of “connection” to offer. A fully-articulated mark-transmission account needs 
to make “connection” precise—as Salmon (1994, 1997) and Dowe (1995, 2000) attempt to do—without appealing 
to causation. In an earlier draft, we said that for a sign exhibited by c to be acquired by e, the events must either have 
no gap between them or be connected by a sequence of events that all exhibit the sign. An anonymous referee 
expressed puzzlement, remarking: “Presumably one could in principle have mark transmission across a spatio-
temporal gap, so that should not be what is meant by ‘gap’.” We agree and have dropped the term. However, we 
think that in the context of causal process accounts of causation, the idea that there should be no spatio-temporal 
gaps is very inviting. As Armstrong (2004, 447) puts it: “There is a deep predisposition to think that where cause 
and effect are not contiguous in both space and time we can always trace an intermediate chain of causes that links 
the cause to its distant effect.” Armstrong defends the predisposition against the objection that causation by omission 
violates it. Unremarked by Armstrong is that one may satisfy the spirit of the predisposition without requiring 
spatio-temporal contiguity for causes and effects. One may cut away the concern with spatio-temporal contiguity 
from Armstrong’s predisposition and obtain our compositionality constraint, which is satisfied by accounts of 
causation that have no special problem with causation by omission. 
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Ehring’s (A) and (B) clauses correspond, respectively, to direct and indirect causation in the 
compositionality constraint. Whenever P causes Q, it either does so directly or it does so 
indirectly by way some intermediaries Ri, each of which is an effect of P and a cause of Q.  
 If, as Hall (2004) maintains, there are two fundamentally different varieties of 
causation—a relation of causal production and a relation of causal dependence—then one might 
worry that the compositionality constraint is an artifact of production accounts. But standard 
accounts of causal dependence are also committed to the compositionality constraint. To 
illustrate, consider Lewis’s (1973) counterfactual theory.  
According to Lewis, an event e depends causally on an event c if and only if the 
following two counterfactuals are true: (1) if c were to occur, then e would occur; and, (2) if c 
were not to occur, then e would not occur. Lewis maintains that if e causally depends on c, then c 
is a cause of e. But he rejects the converse, writing (563), “Causation must always be transitive; 
causal dependence may not be; so there can be causation without causal dependence.” In order to 
secure transitivity, Lewis does not immediately analyze causation in terms of causal dependence. 
Instead, he tells us that a causal chain is a finite sequence < 𝑐, 𝑑, 𝑒, … > of actual particular 
events such that d causally depends on c, e causally depends on d, and so on. And then he says 
that an event c is a cause of an event e if and only if there is a causal chain beginning with c and 
ending with e. Now, any initial segment of a causal chain is itself a causal chain, and any tail 
segment of a causal chain is also a causal chain. Therefore, we have the following version of the 
compositionality constraint on Lewis’s account: if c is a cause of e, then either there is no 
intermediary between c and e, or there are some intermediaries di on a causal chain  
< 𝑐, 𝑑1, 𝑑2, … , 𝑑2, 𝑒 >, where for each di, c is a cause of di, and di is a cause of e.
2 
                                                 
2 The account in Lewis (2000) also satisfies the compositionality constraint because (as before) Lewis takes 
causation to be the ancestral of causal dependence, now understood as influence (191). 
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 The compositionality constraint is also entailed by some probabilistic accounts of 
causation. For brevity, we’ll focus on an obvious example—Lewis’s (1986) analysis of chancy 
causation.3 As with his counterfactual theory, Lewis analyzes chancy causation in two stages. He 
first cashes out chancy causal dependence in terms of counterfactual conditionals about single-
case probabilities. According to Lewis, e chancily causally depends on c iff the probability that e 
occurs would be greater if c were to occur than if c were not to occur. Then, he takes chancy 
causation to be the ancestral (the transitive closure) of chancy causal dependence. Since c 
chancily causes e iff there is a chain of chancy causal dependences running from c to e, it follows 
that either e chancily depends on c directly or for any event d on the chain of dependences 
running from c to e, c is a chancy cause of d and d is a chancy cause of e. 
 Finally, all of the purely structural theories of actual causation that have been advanced in 
the graphical causal modeling tradition (so far as we know) are committed to the 
compositionality constraint. In the graphical causal modeling tradition, structural causal relations 
hold between variables in a causal model, which is often (partially) represented pictorially by a 
directed graph. A purely structural theory of actual causation provides conditions for counting an 
evaluated variable as an actual cause of some other evaluated variable, where those conditions 
are given in terms of the structural causal relations and the results of possible manipulations of 
the variables in the model.4 For example, Woodward’s (2003) account says that C = c is an 
actual cause of E = e iff the following two conditions both hold: 
                                                 
3 The probabilistic account in Menzies (1989) also entails the compositionality constraint. The account in Glynn 
(2011) does not entail the constraint, but he tells us (personal communication) that he hopes his account is consistent 
with the constraint. 
4 The details of the relationship between actual causation and structural causation are a matter of ongoing debate 
(see Hitchcock 2001, Woodward 2003, Chockler and Halpern 2004, Halpern and Pearl 2005, Hitchcock 2007a and 
2007b, Glymour et al. 2010, Livengood 2013, Halpern and Hitchcock 2015, Halpern 2016, and Blanchard and 
Schaffer 2017). Purely structural accounts, such as the three definitions of actual causation given in Chapter 2 of 
Halpern (2016), are to be contrasted with accounts that supplement the structural machinery with considerations of 
defaults, typicality, or normality. See Halpern and Hitchcock (2015) for a recent account that supplements structural 
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 (W1) The actual value of C is c, and the actual value of E is e. 
 (W2) There exists a path P from C to E, and there exist manipulations do(C = c*) for  
  c*  c and do(W=w) for w in the redundancy range of P such that EW=w, C=c*  e. 
 
Where w is in the redundancy range of a path P iff carrying out the manipulations denoted by 
do(W = w) leaves all of the variables on P at their actual values. 
 In the language of graphical causal modeling, the compositionality constraint may be 
stated precisely as follows: 
 If C = c is an actual cause of E = e, then either C is a direct structural cause of E or there  
 is at least one path P from C to E such that for every variable D, if D is on P and D = d,  
 then C = c is an actual cause of D = d and D = d is an actual cause of E = e. 
 
If C = c is an actual cause of E = e according to Woodward’s account, then there is a path from C 
to E in the causal graph. Moreover, there are manipulations of variables other than C such that E 
retains its initial value but would have a different value were C to be manipulated appropriately 
in that context. Pick a variable on that path. Call it D. Since the manipulations of variables other 
than C were in the redundancy range for the path P, the value of D remains at its actual value d 
after the imagined manipulation. But the value of D would have to change if C were manipulated 
appropriately. Otherwise, the value of E would not change following a manipulation of C as it 
should. Hence, C = c is an actual cause of D = d. Similarly, if we carry out a manipulation of 
variables that satisfies condition (W2), then we bring about a context in which there is a way of 
manipulating D such that E takes on a new value. Therefore, Woodward’s account entails the 
compositionality constraint.  
 
 
                                                 
machinery with considerations of defaults, typicality, and normality. See Livengood, Sytsma, and Rose (2017) for 
further experimental work on such “DTN accounts.” Halpern also discusses defaults, typicality, and normality in 
Chapter 3 of his book. 
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2. Ordinary Causal Attributions and the Compositionality Constraint 
The compositionality constraint strikes us as a plausible requirement on any adequate theory of 
actual causation. But how might we test to see whether what strikes us as plausible is correct? 
One very tempting approach is to adopt what Livengood, Sytsma, and Rose (2017) call the folk 
attribution desideratum (FAD) as a condition of adequacy for theorizing about actual causation 
and require that what a theory of actual causation says about concrete, everyday cases accords 
with ordinary causal attributions. As noted in that article, “ordinary causal attribution” refers to 
the use of language like “X caused Y” (see Sytsma et al. 2019 for a further discussion of causal 
language more broadly construed). While our primary focus in this paper is on ordinary causal 
attributions, we discuss the broader question of causal cognition in Section 4.  
Ordinary causal attributions are central to recent empirical work on actual causation. And 
as detailed in Livengood, Sytsma, and Rose (2017), many philosophers and other researchers 
developing theories of actual causation have expressed some commitment to the FAD.5 So, do 
ordinary causal attributions satisfy the compositionality constraint? On the basis of existing 
empirical research, we conjecture that they do not always abide by this constraint, such that it is 
not universally treated as a constraint on ordinary causal attributions. One robust finding in 
recent empirical work on ordinary causal attribution is that injunctive norms play a substantial 
role in people’s judgments about concrete cases.6 People’s judgments about what someone or 
something ought to do in a given situation have a significant impact on ordinary causal 
attributions. We have argued that these findings are best explained by what we call the 
responsibility view, which maintains that the default concept of causation at play in ordinary 
                                                 
5 See Bernstein (2017), however, for a dissenting view. 
6 See Hilton and Slugoski (1986); Alicke (1992); Knobe (2006); Hitchcock and Knobe (2009); Sytsma, Livengood, 
and Rose (2012); Kominsky et al. (2015); and, Livengood, Sytsma, and Rose (2017), among others. 
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causal attributions has some indispensable evaluative content alongside whatever non-evaluative 
content it has (Sytsma, Livengood and Rose 2012; Livengood, Sytsma, and Rose 2017; Sytsma 
and Livengood MS; Sytsma et al. 2019; Sytsma MS).7 Hence, on our view, this concept is a kind 
of thick ethical concept akin to our concept of responsibility. If so, then ordinary causal 
attributions will tend to violate the compositionality constraint for cases where someone or 
something is responsible for an effect by way of an intermediary that does not share in the 
responsibility.8 We tested several cases of this type and report our results in this and the 
following section. As predicted, we found that ordinary causal attributions by and large do not 
satisfy the compositionality constraint in these cases. 
 
2.1 Poisoned Cup 
In our first study, we gave participants the following vignette: 
Amy wants to kill her daughter, Jessica, but she doesn’t want to go to prison for murder. 
As such, Amy hatches a plan. She arranges for a baby sitter, Courtney, to take care of 
Jessica while she is out of town on business. Before leaving, Amy laces one of Jessica’s 
sippy cups with a deadly poison that is very difficult to detect. That evening, Courtney 
gives Jessica juice in the poisoned sippy cup. Jessica drinks the juice and dies two hours 
later. 
 
We then asked participants to rate their level of agreement or disagreement with the following 
two causal attributions on a seven-point scale anchored at 1 with “strongly disagree,” at 4 with 
“neutral,” and at 7 with “strongly agree”: (1) Amy caused Jessica’s death; (2) Courtney caused 
Jessica’s death.9 
                                                 
7 McGrath (2005) defends a similar idea, which she calls the NORMAL PROPOSAL, for causation by omission. 
8 One might raise other worries about whether ordinary causal attributions satisfy the compositionality constraint. 
See Livengood (2013) for one direction this might go.  
9 An anonymous referee observed that while we characterize compositionality in binary terms—with every event 
either being an actual cause or failing to be an actual cause—our measure is a seven-point scale. The referee then 
wondered whether violations of compositionality might come in degrees: for example, where some event c is 
thought to be a very strong cause of some event e but a significantly weaker cause of a required intermediary event 
d. This might arise despite the average ratings being greater than the mid-point. We think this is an interesting 
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The Poisoned Cup case seems like a straightforward example of a simple sequence 
connecting a cause to an effect through a salient intermediary: Amy brings about Jessica’s death 
via Courtney. Given this simple model, according to the compositionality constraint, if Amy is 
an actual cause of Jessica’s death, then Courtney is an actual cause of Jessica’s death as well. 
Assuming ordinary causal attributions uphold the compositionality constraint, participants should 
tend to affirm the second statement if they affirm the first. However, in the Poisoned Cup case, 
the responsible party brings about an effect through an intermediary who does not share in the 
responsibility. Amy dupes Courtney into delivering the poison to Jessica. Hence, the 
responsibility view predicts a failure of compositionality. If ordinary causal attributions align 
with responsibility judgments, then participants should affirm that Amy caused Jessica’s death 
but deny that Courtney caused Jessica’s death.  
 We collected responses for the Poisoned Cup case online from 34 native English-
speakers, 18 years of age or older, who completed the survey, had not taken a survey through the 
website previously, and had at most minimal training in philosophy.10 The same restrictions were 
used for each study we report. The results are striking and strongly align with our prediction 
(Figure 1): each participant completely agreed with the claim that Amy caused Jessica’s death 
(M=7), and two-thirds of participants (22/34) completely disagreed with the claim that Courtney 
                                                 
possibility, but we do not have space to explore it experimentally. One might wonder whether (and if so, under what 
conditions) participants conflate an attribution that [X is a cause of Y to degree D] with an attribution to degree D 
that [X is a cause of Y]. While we think it is possible that participants would confuse the two in some settings, we 
doubt that they typically do so. But even if participants frequently conflate them, we do not think it threatens the 
points we want to make in this paper. We do wonder, however, whether there is any interesting relationship between 
attributions of what we might call full causation and attributions of what we might call partial or graded causation. 
Perhaps the two are related in the same way as full belief and partial belief. To our knowledge, no one has 
investigated the relationship here, though there is some excellent work on partial causation in the psychology 
literature, e.g. Lagnado, D., Gerstenberg, T., and Zultan, R. (2013). 
10 Responses were collected through the Philosophical Personality website (philosophicalpersonality.com). 
Participants were counted as having more than minimal training in philosophy if they were philosophy majors, had 
completed a degree with a major in philosophy, or had taken graduate-level courses in philosophy. Participants were 
70.6% women, average age 35.6, ranging from 20 to 55 
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caused Jessica’s death (M=2.06). The central tendency of the ratings for Amy was statistically 
greater than the neutral value of 4—indicating that participants agreed with the claim that Amy 
caused Jessica’s death. Whereas, the central tendency of the ratings for Courtney was statistically 
smaller than the neutral value of 4—indicating that participants disagreed with the claim that 
Courtney caused Jessica’s death.11 The effect sizes were very large for Amy and large for 
Courtney.12 
 
Figure 1: Histograms for Study 1 
 
 
 The causal attributions we observed in our first study by and large violate the 
compositionality constraint, since (1) Amy does not bring about Jessica’s death directly but does 
                                                 
11 Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed rank tests rejected the hypothesis that the central tendency for “Courtney” was 
greater than or equal to 4 (V=58, p=3.568e-5) and the hypothesis that the central tendency for “Amy” was less than 
or equal to 4 (V=595, p=2.922e-9). 
12 We used Rogmann’s (2013) orddom package in R to calculate the “probability of superiority” and Cliff’s delta for 
our comparisons. The within-subject probability of superiority of “Amy” against an equal-length vector of 4’s was 
1.00, meaning that every individual’s evaluation of the claim that Amy caused the death was strictly greater than the 
neutral value of 4. Cliff’s delta for Amy compared with the neutral vector was also 1. The within-subject probability 
of superiority of the neutral vector against “Courtney” was 0.794. Cliff’s delta for the neutral vector compared with 
Courtney was 0.676 with a 95% confidence interval of [0.376, 0.848]. From now on, we will simply write 95% 
confidence intervals in square brackets after a point estimate. In this paper, we will use the following ordinary 
language descriptions of Cliff’s delta results: 0-20% is practically no effect; 20-40% is a small effect; 40-60% is a 
moderate effect; 60-80% is a large effect; and greater than 80% is a very large effect. See McGraw and Wong 
(1992) for the theory. 
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so by way of Courtney, (2) participants all affirm that Amy caused Jessica’s death, and (3) and 
the vast majority of participants deny that Courtney caused Jessica’s death. We predicted these 
results and explain them by appeal to the responsibility view. As a check on our explanatory 
framework, we ran two further studies. According to the responsibility view, if we increase 
Courtney’s responsibility for the outcome, her causal ratings should increase, and if we decrease 
Amy’s responsibility, her causal ratings should decrease. We tested these predictions in our 
second and third studies, respectively.13 Responses were collected from 59 participants.14 The 
results agreed with the predictions (Figure 2). In Study 2, approximately 60 percent of 
participants completely agreed with the claim that Amy caused Jessica’s death (17/29, M=5.97) 
and the claim that Courtney caused Jessica’s death (18/29, M=6.03). In Study 2, the central 
tendencies of the ratings for Amy and for Courtney were statistically greater than 4.15 By 
contrast, in Study 3, more than half of the participants completely disagreed with the claim that 
Amy caused Jessica’s death (16/30, M=2.43) and the claim that Courtney caused Jessica’s death 
(20/30, M=2.03). In Study 3, the central tendencies of the ratings for Amy and for Courtney were 
statistically less than 4.16 
                                                 
13 In our second study we modified the vignette from our first study to read: “Amy wants to kill her daughter, 
Jessica. As such, Amy hatches a plan. She arranges for a contract killer, Courtney, to poison Jessica while she is out 
of town on business. After Amy leaves, Courtney laces one of Jessica’s sippy cups with a deadly poison that is very 
difficult to detect. That evening, Courtney gives Jessica juice in the poisoned sippy cup. Jessica drinks the juice and 
dies two hours later.” In our third study, the vignette read: “Amy has a daughter, Jessica. Amy is going out of town 
on business. She arranges for a baby sitter, Courtney, to take care of Jessica. Before leaving, Amy purchases a new 
sippy cup for Jessica. Unbeknownst to Amy, the sippy cup has been laced with a deadly poison that is very difficult 
to detect. That evening, Courtney gives Jessica juice in the poisoned sippy cup. Jessica drinks the juice and dies two 
hours later.” 
14 64.4% women, average age 38.4, ranging from 18 to 65 
15 AMY: V=362, p=8.564e-5, Δ=0.759 [0.422, 0.911]; COURTNEY: V=343, p=5.206e-5, Δ=0.793 [0.488, 0.925]. 
16 AMY: V=84.5, p=0.001408, Δ=0.633 [0.279, 0.836]; COURTNEY: V=21.5, p=1.545e-5, Δ=0.667 [0.357, 0.844]. 
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Figure 2: Histograms for Study 2 (top) and Study 3 (bottom) 
 
2.2 Objections and Replies 
Even if our preferred explanation of the results for the Poison Cup case is incorrect, we think our 
results provide a clear example of a failure of compositionality for ordinary causal attributions. If 
you disagree, we suspect it is for one of three reasons. First, you might think that our participants 
are confusing causation with responsibility in a way that makes their answers irrelevant to 
evaluating the compositionality constraint. Second, you might think that we should have asked 
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about actions or events or facts, rather than agents. Third, you might think that we have the 
wrong causal model for the case and that the underlying causal structure in the Poison Cup case 
should be represented by a collider rather than a chain. 
  
2.2.1 Causation versus Responsibility 
You might be worried that participants in our study were confusing causation with responsibility. 
On our view, ordinary people are not confused. Rather, the default concept of causation at play 
in ordinary causal attributions has both descriptive content and normative, evaluative content. 
We think that the responsibility view best accords with the available empirical data. However, 
one might defend what we call a bias view according to which the default concept does not have 
any evaluative content but ordinary causal attributions are strongly biased, e.g. by a desire to 
assign blame (Alicke 1992). Accepting a bias view, one might argue that the default concept is 
the same concept targeted by philosophical accounts.  
We have three replies. First, explaining the results of the present study would require a 
self-underminingly large bias. If the compositionality constraint is a highly intuitive principle 
underlying the concept of causation that philosophers have traditionally targeted and if that 
concept is the default concept at play in ordinary causal attributions, then any bias strong enough 
to override the compositionality constraint would lead to incredibly large effects in other cases in 
the literature. The compositionality constraint does appear to be a highly intuitive principle 
underlying the concept of causation that philosophers working have traditionally targeted. But 
we do not see incredibly large effects in other cases in the literature. Hence, the concept of 
causation that philosophers have traditionally targeted is not the default concept at play in 
ordinary causal attributions. Second, the burden of proof is on proponents of the bias view. 
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Comparing the responsibility view and the bias view raises the difficult challenge of 
distinguishing between the systematic misapplication of a concept and the correct application of 
an alternative concept. Neither we nor proponents of the bias view have articulated any general 
way of drawing such a distinction. But in the absence of some general way of drawing the 
distinction, both charity and simplicity favor the responsibility view, since the responsibility 
view takes ordinary causal attributions to result from the correct application, while the bias view 
does not. Third, we have elsewhere conducted studies aimed at experimentally distinguishing the 
responsibility view and the bias view (for which, see Sytsma and Livengood MS), and those 
studies favor the responsibility view. 
 
2.2.2 The wrong relata? 
One might worry that while philosophical accounts of actual causation have typically focused on 
causation between events, we asked participants about whether an agent (Amy, Courtney) caused 
an event (Jessica’s death). Perhaps if we asked about the agents’ actions, then participants’ 
judgments would shift into line with the compositionality constraint. As noted above, however, 
our focus in this paper is on accounts that follow the FAD (see Section 4 for further discussion). 
And although it has not been much remarked on, one clear finding in recent empirical work on 
causal attribution is that ordinary people often count agents as causes. Further, thought 
experiments in the causation literature often involve cases where an agent is closely tied to the 
action she performs (a hiker ducking, a kid throwing a rock, etc.), and sometimes, authors shift 
back and forth between saying that an action or event caused something and saying that a 
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relevant agent did.17 As such, we believe that a failure of compositionality for attributions to 
agents would be problematic for many accounts of actual causation, even if there were not a 
corresponding failure for attributions to events. That said, we expect that our findings will 
generalize.  
Previous research suggests that asking participants about an agent’s action does not 
dramatically alter ordinary causal attributions relative to asking about the agent directly 
(Livengood, Sytsma, and Rose 2017). As such, we expect that the way we phrased our test 
statements is not driving the responses. Nonetheless, this is an empirical claim that is easily 
checked. In our fourth study we gave participants the same probe as in the first study, but we 
changed the two test attributions as follows: (1) Amy caused Jessica’s death by poisoning the 
sippy cup; (2) Courtney caused Jessica’s death by giving her juice in the sippy cup. Responses 
were collected from 137 participants.18 The results were not significantly different from the 
results for the original study (Figure 3): almost every participant (129/137) completely agreed 
with the first claim (M=6.84), and roughly two-thirds (92/137) completely disagreed with the 
second claim (M=2.06). As in our first study, the ratings for Amy were statistically greater than 
4, while the ratings for Courtney were statistically smaller than 4.19 
                                                 
17 Hume famously does this. See also McDermott (1995, 527) and Halpern and Pearl (2005, 868 and 871). Paul and 
Hall (2013, 4) mention the possibility of confusion but reject agents as proper causes, writing, “While Suzy might 
cause a window to break, she does so only in virtue of the way she is involved in an event.” 
18 66.4% women, average age 33.7, ranging from 18 to 71 
19 AMY: V=595, p=2.922e-9, Δ=0.941 [0.862, 0.975]; COURTNEY: V=1246.5, p=3.568e-5, Δ=0.667 [0.539, 0.764]. 
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Figure 3: Histograms for Study 4 
 
 In our fifth study we went further, changing the two attributions to ask directly about the 
agent’s actions: (1) Amy’s action of poisoning the sippy cup caused Jessica’s death; (2) 
Courtney’s action of giving Jessica juice in the sippy cup caused Jessica’s death. Responses were 
collected from 56 participants.20 Almost every participant (49/56) completely agreed with the 
first claim (M=6.52), and almost half of the participants (26/56) completely disagreed with the 
second claim (M=3.36). The results again suggest that the causal attributions of most ordinary 
people do not satisfy the compositionality constraint for this case (Figure 4).21 Comparing the 
ratings for Amy and Courtney directly, we found that they were statistically different and that the 
effect was moderate.22 However, we would be remiss if we did not point out that in this study a 
notable minority of participants (16/56) completely agreed with the second claim, which is in 
                                                 
20 71.4% women, average age 35.2, ranging from 18 to 74 
21 AMY: V=1450.5, p=8.176e-11, Δ=0.839 [0.637, 0.933]; COURTNEY: V=513.5, p=0.04302, Δ=0.214 [-0.045, 
0.447].  
22 A Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed rank test rejected the hypothesis that the central tendency for “Amy” was equal 
to the central tendency for “Courtney”: V=708, p=3.595e-7, Δ=0.571 [0.392, 0.709]. 
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line with the compositionality constraint. What individual differences might account for our 
results is an interesting question that deserves to be studied further, but since the clear majority 
opinion is inconsistent with the compositionality constraint, we will not pursue it further here.  
 
Figure 4: Histograms for Study 5 
 
2.2.3 Collider versus Chain 
One might worry that we haven’t picked out the right causal structure and that on an alternative 
causal structure responses to the Poison Cup case do not indicate a failure of compositionality. 
Specifically, one might argue that Amy’s action and Courtney’s action should be thought of as 
operating conjointly to bring about Jessica’s death, rather than in sequence. Restricting attention 
to a causal model with variables for Amy’s action, Courtney’s action, and Jessica’s status, the 
two alternatives are pictured in Figure 5. 
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 Figure 5: Collider Model (top) and Chain Model (bottom) for the Poison Cup Case 
 
In line with the actions specified in the follow-up study above, we might construe the 
relevant actions as Amy poisoning the cup and Courtney giving Jessica juice in the cup. 
Construed in this way, either event might have occurred without the other. On such a construal, 
the Poison Cup case is best modeled with a collider. If participants were operating with such a 
model, then their responses would not violate the compositionality constraint, since Courtney is 
not an intermediary between Amy and Jessica in a collider model.23 
There are reasons to believe that the folk model in the Poison Cup case really is 
sequential (i.e. a chain model). One reason to think that the folk model is sequential is that it was 
                                                 
23 An anonymous referee argued that the normatively correct model has both a collider and a chain. On the one hand, 
Amy hires Courtney to babysit, and hence, Amy causes Courtney to cause Jessica’s death. On the other hand, the 
events the cup contains poison and the cup is given to Jessica are independent in the sense that each might happen 
without the other happening, and the variables representing those events are independently manipulable. Therefore, 
in the normatively correct model, variables for the poisoning and for the giving should form a collider at a variable 
representing the event Jessica ingests poison or the event Jessica dies. We agree that one can model the system in 
this way. But we are not sure that the referee’s model is normatively correct. This depends on whether there is a 
unique, correct choice of variables to use in building the model, and we are not confident that there is. If we use the 
variables Amy [plans to kill/doesn’t], Poison Cup [yes/no], Hire Courtney [yes/no], Courtney Gives Cup to Jessica 
[yes/no], and Jessica Dies [yes/no], then the referee is correct in thinking that there is both a causal chain from Amy 
to Jessica Dies by way of Hire Courtney and Courtney Gives Cup to Jessica. But there are plausible alternative 
choices of variables. We try to induce such an alternative in Study 6. 
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the first model that we constructed for the scenario. Only after thinking about the case for an 
extended period did one of us start to worry that the case might be modeled by a collider, and we 
(the authors) continue to disagree about how plausible the collider model actually is. But the fact 
that we both initially wanted to model the case with a chain and only later worried about a 
collider structure is some (admittedly weak) reason to think that participants in our studies 
modeled the case with a chain. Moreover, the chain model better captures a key element of the 
mechanism in the Poison Cup case, so it is more likely that participants operated with such a 
model. Amy used Courtney as a delivery device for the poison. Courtney is part of the 
mechanism that Amy used to bring about Jessica’s death. Hence, Courtney was a salient 
intermediary on the path the poison takes from Amy’s hand to Jessica’s stomach. 
 One might accept that the chain model is the most natural, however, while still worrying 
that participants might have been operating with a collider model. Whether participants in our 
studies used a collider model or a chain model to represent the Poison Cup case is an empirical 
matter. But exactly how to settle the question is not obvious. One plausible option is to 
emphasize the transfer of the poison, describing Courtney as giving Jessica the poisoned cup. 
Described in this way, a collider model seems far less plausible, since Courtney could not have 
given Jessica the poisoned cup if Amy had not first laced the cup with poison. By emphasizing 
the transfer of the poison, we implicitly encourage participants to use the variables Amy [plans to 
kill/doesn’t], Poison Cup [yes/no], Hire Courtney [yes/no], Courtney Gives Poisoned Cup to 
Jessica [yes/no], and Jessica Dies [yes/no]. Given that collection of variables, the normatively 
correct model for the story has a collider at Courtney Gives Poisoned Cup to Jessica, but it is not 
possible to assert that Amy poisoning the cup caused Jessica’s death and also that Courtney 
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giving the poisoned cup to Jessica did not cause Jessica’s death without violating the 
compositionality constraint. 
Hence, in our sixth study, we gave participants the vignette used in our first study, but we 
changed the statements that we asked participants to evaluate in order to emphasize the transfer 
of the poison, as follows: (1) Amy caused Jessica’s death by lacing the cup with poison; (2) 
Courtney caused Jessica’s death by giving her the cup laced with poison. Responses were 
collected from 27 participants.24 Again, almost every participant (22/27) completely agreed with 
the first claim (M=6.56), and more than half (15/27) completely disagreed with the second claim 
(M=2.48), which again suggests that the causal attributions of most ordinary people do not 
satisfy the compositionality constraint for the Poisoned Cup case (Figure 6).25 
 
Figure 6: Histograms for Study 6 
  
 
                                                 
24 59.3% women, average age 34.8, ranging from 18 to 64. The number of participants was small in this study 
because we were only confirming the existence of a large effect, not trying to precisely estimate the effect size. 
25 AMY: V=362, p=0.0003539, Δ=0.926 [0.605, 0.988]; COURTNEY: V=57, p=0.001538, Δ=0.556 [0.181, 0.789].  
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3. Further Studies 
At this point, we think we have made a prima facie case that ordinary causal attributions do not 
tend to satisfy the compositionality constraint for all cases. In this section, we present some 
further studies that expand on our initial findings and strengthen our prima facie case. 
 
3.1 Poisoned Candy 
We begin with a case that is similar to the Poison Cup case but includes both a collider and a 
chain. In our seventh study, participants were given the following vignette: 
Amy is a seven-year-old girl visiting an amusement park on a school trip. Amy's mother, 
Gwen, signed the permission slip allowing Amy to go on the school trip. Elizabeth is a 
park worker who is paid to give out free candy samples to children as part of a marketing 
strategy. Elizabeth has no idea that the candy she is giving out has been poisoned by the 
evil Cruella, who hates both children and amusement parks. 
  
As it happens, Elizabeth offers Amy some candy, which was poisoned by Cruella. Amy 
takes the candy, eats it, and dies. 
 
Participants were then asked to rate their level of agreement or disagreement with four causal 
attributions using the same seven-point scale as in the previous studies: (1) Cruella caused 
Amy’s death by poisoning the candy; (2) Gwen caused Amy’s death by allowing her to go on the 
school trip; (3) Amy caused her own death by eating the candy; (4) Elizabeth caused Amy’s 
death by giving her the candy. 
 The Poison Candy case differs from the previous scenario in that the poisoning isn’t 
directed at a specific individual. Another difference is that we’ve added a description of an 
additional agent (Gwen) who makes a decision that ends up putting the victim (Amy) into harm’s 
way. In this case, four key events were involved in bringing about Amy’s death: Cruella 
poisoned the candy, Gwen allowed Amy to go to the amusement park where Elizabeth could 
give her the poisoned candy, Elizabeth gave Amy the poisoned candy, and Amy ate the poisoned 
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candy. What is the causal structure for this case? Following the reasoning given for the previous 
case, it seems that Cruella, Elizabeth, and Amy stand in a causal chain, since each is involved in 
transferring the poison. Gwen is not part of this chain, however, since she had nothing to do with 
the poison. Nonetheless, she did play a role in bringing about the outcome since she put Amy 
into position to eat the poisoned candy. Cruella poisoning the candy and Gwen allowing Amy to 
go to the park were necessary for Elizabeth to be able to give Amy poisoned candy. 
 We predicted that participants would judge that Cruella caused Amy’s death. Assuming 
the model suggested above, compositionality would then predict that people would also judge 
that Elizabeth caused Amy’s death by giving her the candy and that Amy caused her own death 
by eating the candy. In contrast, based on the responsibility view we predicted that participants 
would only affirm that Cruella caused Amy’s death, since Cruella, and Cruella alone, violated a 
clear injunctive norm and should be held responsible for the outcome.  
Responses for the Poison Candy case were collected from 60 participants.26 Again, the 
results were in line with the prediction based on the responsibility view and by and large did not 
abide by the compositionality constraint (Figure 7): almost every participant (56/60) completely 
agreed with the claim that Cruella caused the death (M=6.78), while half completely disagreed 
that Elizabeth caused the death (M=2.57) and a majority completely disagreed that Amy caused 
her own death (36/60; M=2.28). In addition, a large majority completely disagreed that Gwen 
caused Amy’s death (48/60; M=1.57).27 
 
                                                 
26 75.0% women, average age 33.2, ranging from 18 to 60 
27 CRUELLA: V=1796.5, p=1.523e-13, Δ=0.933 [0.766, 0.982]; ELIZABETH: V=250, p=3.351e-6, Δ=0.483 [0.245, 
0.667]; AMY: V=162.5, p=4.997e-8, Δ=0.583 [0.356, 0.746]; GWEN: V=46.5, p=6.082e-12, Δ=0.8 [0.602, 0.905]. 
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Figure 7: Histograms for Study 7 
 
3.2 Revolver 
The intermediaries in the cases we’ve looked at so far have been agents, but we expect similar 
considerations to hold when they are what philosophers would consider non-agentive objects.28 
Specifically, we predict that when an agent brings about an outcome via a series of properly 
                                                 
28 Research by Bloom (2007), Rose (2015), and Rose and Schaffer (2017), among others, suggests that people tend 
to take an agentive perspective on nature as a whole, which provides reason to expect that people will hold “non-
agents” responsible. 
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functioning mechanical intermediaries, people won’t treat the intermediaries as being responsible 
for the outcome, and hence won’t judge that they caused the outcome. In our eighth study, we 
gave participants the following vignette: 
 Trent has decided to kill his father, Brad. He aims his loaded revolver at Brad and pulls 
 the trigger, releasing the hammer. The hammer strikes the cartridge, igniting the gun 
 powder. The gun powder explodes, driving the bullet from the gun. The bullet hits Brad 
 in the head. He dies instantly. 
 
Participants were then asked to rate their level of agreement or disagreement with four causal 
attributions using the same seven-point scale as in the previous studies: (1) Trent caused Brad’s 
death; (2) the hammer caused Brad’s death; (3) the gun powder caused Brad’s death; and (4) the 
bullet caused Brad’s death. 
Our causal model for this story is a chain: Trent pulls the trigger, which causes the 
hammer to strike, which causes the gunpowder to explode, which causes the bullet to hit Brad, 
which causes Brad to die. Given this model, if ordinary causal attributions uphold the 
compositionality constraint and people say that Trent caused Brad’s death, then they should say 
that the hammer, the gunpowder, and the bullet all caused Brad’s death as well. 
 Responses for the Revolver case were collected from 51 participants.29 Again, the results 
were striking (Figure 8): 43 participants completely agreed that Trent caused Brad’s death, and 
another five responded with a six (M=6.71). The central tendency of the responses for Trent was 
statistically significantly above 4, and the difference was very large.30 By contrast, the modal 
answer for the hammer and for the powder was complete disagreement. The central tendency of 
the responses for the hammer was statistically below 4, and the difference was moderate.31 
Similarly, the central tendency of the responses for the powder was statistically below 4, and the 
                                                 
29 74.5% women, average age 36.2, ranging from 18 to 68 
30 TRENT: V=1296.5, p=5.277e-11, Δ=0.961 [0.785, 0.993] 
31 HAMMER: V=182.5, p=2.989e-5, Δ=0.529 [0.280, 0.712] 
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difference was large.32 The responses for the bullet were bimodal with slightly more participants 
answering “completely agree” than answering “completely disagree.” The central tendency of 
the responses for the bullet was not statistically different from 4.33 
 
 
Figure 8: Histograms for Study 8 
 
 
 
                                                 
32 POWDER: V=117, p=2.963e-6, Δ=0.647 [0.428, 0.794] 
33 BULLET: V=552.5, p=0.469, Δ=0.157 [-0.105, 0.398] 
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3.3 GFCI  
In the Revolver case, we asked participants to consider a case where the causal intermediaries are 
mechanical, and we saw the same pattern of results as in previous studies. However, the 
Revolver case still has a person acting to set events in motion and a person being harmed. Many 
people (including an anonymous referee) have expressed concern that lay people might treat 
causation differently when they are considering cases involving agents than when they are 
considering cases involving non-agents. They worry that if people think differently about 
causation when agents are involved, then the results of studies like those we have conducted are 
not informative about the ordinary concept of causation. One way to express the worry is as a 
variation on the first objection to our initial study. People are confusing causation with 
responsibility. By presenting cases involving agents, we are encouraging that confusion. 
Moreover, the objection continues, if we had presented cases that did not involve agents, we 
would not have seen notable violations of the compositionality constraint. 
 An anonymous referee suggested that we could provide evidence against an evaluative 
reading of “caused” by presenting cases involving only inanimate objects. As the referee put it, 
“With no agents involved, the worry that a cause question is being interpreted as a blame 
question would be largely addressed, except perhaps for the possibility of metaphorical 
attributions of blame to inanimate occurrences.” Hence, in our ninth study, we tried to minimize 
the active role of agents while still having a case that we expected to show violation of the 
compositionality constraint. We gave participants the following vignette: 
 John is a scientist conducting a very important experiment on an unusual species of plant. 
 His experiment requires growing his plants under a special light, which is plugged into an 
 outlet with a ground fault circuit interrupter (GFCI) safety mechanism. The pipes running 
 to John’s laboratory were correctly manufactured and installed, and the system was 
 protected from any changes in weather condition.  
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 Despite there being nothing wrong with the pipes, one day a pipe burst in John’s 
 laboratory. Water ran into the outlet powering the special light. A properly functioning 
 GFCI safety mechanism will break the circuit so that no power flows through its outlet if 
 exposed to water in this way. And in fact, the GFCI safety mechanism did break the 
 circuit. The special light turned off and the experiment was ruined. 
 
Participants were then asked to rate their level of agreement or disagreement with two causal 
attributions using the same seven-point scale as in our other studies: (1) The pipe bursting caused 
the experiment to be ruined; and (2) the GFCI safety mechanism breaking the circuit caused the 
experiment to be ruined. 
 Our causal model for this story is a chain: a pipe bursts, which causes water to run into 
the outlet, which causes the GFCI to break the circuit, which causes the light to turn off, which 
causes the experiment to be ruined. The pipe bursting doesn’t directly cause the experiment to be 
ruined. If the pipe bursting causes the experiment to be ruined, it does so by way of the GFCI. 
Given this model, if folk causal attributions satisfy the compositionality constraint and people 
say that the pipe bursting caused the experiment to be ruined, then they should also say that the 
GFCI safety mechanism breaking the circuit caused the experiment to be ruined. The driving 
thought behind the GFCI case was that in cases where some (ultimately bad) random event 
occurs, if a mechanism does what it is supposed to do and in virtue of doing what it is supposed 
to do, a bad outcome results, people will treat causal responsibility as being transmitted by the 
mechanism while denying that the mechanism is itself causally responsible for the bad outcome. 
 Responses for the GFCI case were collected from 163 participants.34 The results were 
mostly consistent with our account of when and why compositionality fails with respect to 
ordinary causal attributions (Figure 9): 72 participants completely agreed that the pipe bursting 
caused the experiment to be ruined, and another 30 responded with a six. The central tendency of 
                                                 
34 72.4% women, average age 45.1, ranging from 16 to 77 
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the responses for the pipe bursting (M=5.48) was statistically significantly above 4, and the 
difference was moderate in size.35 By contrast, the modal answer for the GFCI was complete 
disagreement. Moreover, the central tendency of the responses for the GFCI (M=3.67) was 
statistically below 4, though the difference was practically non-existent.36 
 However, directly comparing responses for the pipe to responses for the GFCI paints a 
different picture. Direct comparison suggests that we are probing two sub-populations that think 
differently about causation. Ratings for the pipe and for the GFCI were statistically different, 
though the effect was small.37 However, when we plot the pairwise differences, we see two 
things. First, we see (as we expected) that many individuals were more willing to say that the 
pipe bursting as opposed to the GFCI breaking the circuit caused the experiment to be ruined. 
But second, we see that 48 participants gave the same rating for both the pipe and the GFCI, 
which is consistent with the compositionality constraint. Moreover, a difference of zero was the 
mode for this distribution! To be sure, more people gave a higher rating for the pipe: 87 in total 
gave a higher rating for the pipe than for the GFCI, and 59 of those gave a rating for the pipe that 
was 4, 5, or 6 points greater than their rating for the GFCI. But as you can see from the bottom 
row of Figure 9—where we have plotted the pairwise differences for our first study next to the 
pairwise differences for Study 9—those 48 participants are striking. 
                                                 
35 PIPE: V=9498, p=2.73e-15, Δ=0.564 [0.434, 0.671] 
36 GFCI: V=4191, p=0.025, Δ=0.117 [-0.029, 0.257]. 
37 Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed rank test rejected the hypothesis that the central tendency for “Pipe” was equal to 
the central tendency for “GFCI” (V=19473, p=6.335e-14). The probability of superiority for “Pipe” over “GFCI” was 
0.534, Δ=0.362 [0.239, 0.473]. 
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Figure 9: Histograms for Study 9 
 
4. Concluding Remarks à la Mode 
We have seen that many theories of actual causation are implicitly committed to the 
compositionality constraint, and we find the constraint plausible. What, then, should we say in 
light of the fact that we found that most ordinary causal attributions violate the constraint across 
the four cases tested? Here are two obvious answers: (1) Follow the FAD and reject the 
constraint, or (2) accept the constraint and abandon the FAD. We think both answers are too 
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extreme and come from neglecting the variety of projects under the umbrella of research on 
causation. In closing, we consider four such projects—conceptual analysis, conceptual 
engineering, descriptive psychology, and realist metaphysics. We suggest that philosophers may 
accept or reject the FAD to differing degrees with respect to different projects and that it is 
possible to consistently pursue several of these projects simultaneously.38 
 Let us begin with one motivation for following the FAD—conceptual analysis. Some 
philosophers have taken themselves to be analyzing the ordinary concept of causation. If one’s 
goal is to analyze our pre-theoretic concept, then one is likely to find the FAD to be a natural 
constraint. Concepts must at some point and in some way give rise to behavior. Plausibly, 
ordinary causal attributions are an exercise of the ordinary concept of causation. If so, then one 
might think that the ordinary concept of causation may be analyzed by carefully examining 
ordinary causal attributions. 
 However, even philosophers, such as Lewis and Menzies, explicitly giving analyses of 
the ordinary concept of causation have offered theories that entail the compositionality 
constraint. How could they have gotten things so wrong? One possibility is that our empirical 
evidence is misleading. Alternatively, one might argue that concepts cannot be studied 
effectively by way of introspection. No armchair reflection reliably reveals what our concepts are 
really like. Better tools are called for.39 
                                                 
38 Our conclusion is largely in agreement with methodological remarks by Armstrong (2004), Hall (2004), Collins, 
Hall, and Paul (2004), Paul and Hall (2013), and Bernstein (2017). Specifically, we agree that what we should say in 
light of observations of ordinary causal attributions should be sensitive to the philosophical project at stake. 
However, we have a different way of categorizing philosophical projects and different opinions with respect to how 
information about ordinary causal attributions engages those projects.  
39 For introductions to some tools to better investigate concepts, see Sytsma and Livengood (2015) and Sytsma et al. 
(2019). 
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We think skepticism about introspection is healthy, but abandoning the armchair 
altogether is not. A better answer begins by reflecting on the target of the analysis. Lewis (1973, 
558-559) writes: 
We sometimes single out one among all the causes of some event and call it “the” cause, 
as if there were no others. Or we single out a few as the “causes,” calling the rest mere 
“causal factors” or “causal conditions.” Or we speak of the “decisive” or “real” or 
“principal” cause. We may select the abnormal or extraordinary causes, or those under 
human control, or those we deem good or bad, or just those we want to talk about. I have 
nothing to say about these principles of invidious discrimination. I am concerned with the 
prior question of what it is to be one of the causes (unselectively speaking). My analysis 
is meant to capture a broad and nondiscriminatory concept of causation. 
 
Plausibly, Menzies was also interested in a broad, nondiscriminatory concept of causation. But is 
the nondiscriminatory concept of causation our pre-theoretic concept? One might suppose that 
we really share a nondiscriminatory concept that is later biased by principles of invidious 
discrimination or that we really share a concept of causation that has purely non-evaluative 
content but that application is later biased by evaluative considerations. We argued in Section 
2.2.1, and in greater detail in Sytsma and Livengood (MS), that bias views are not adequate to 
the empirical data. And we agree with Schaffer (2005, 344) when he observes that some 
discriminatory character is “an inseparable aspect of our causal concept.” The ordinary default 
concept is itself discriminatory and evaluative.  
 One might stop here and wonder whether we have any non-evaluative, egalitarian 
concept of causation at all. As Schaffer (2005, 344) puts it: “Perhaps the idea of a ‘broad and 
nondiscriminatory concept’ [of causation] is a philosopher’s myth.” If that’s right, then 
conceptual analyses are perhaps better thought of as attempts to engineer a more theoretically 
useful concept of causation: one that might be only loosely connected with the ordinary default 
concept. However, the conceptual analyst might retrench in a different way by supposing that 
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there are multiple concepts of causation that have equal or near equal claim to the title of the 
ordinary concept of causation.  
One might follow Danks, Rose, and Machery (2014) in pointing out that causal 
perception is almost certainly non-evaluative in character and that at least some causal reasoning 
also seems to be non-evaluative in character. Perhaps those cognitive activities involve a non-
discriminatory, non-evaluative concept of causation and philosophical theories should be 
understood as targeting that concept. One might maintain that our studies only ever access the 
discriminatory, evaluative concept and still hold out hope that the compositionality constraint is 
true of the nondiscriminatory, non-evaluative concept. All of that may very well be correct. But 
if so, then we are owed an account of how we can isolate the nondiscriminatory, non-evaluative 
concept experimentally.40 Moreover, we will need to experimentally check to see whether that 
concept satisfies the compositionality constraint. Until such research is conducted, philosophers 
aiming to analyze the ordinary concept of causation ought to be suspicious of the constraint. 
 Although many philosophers have maintained that conceptual analysis is central to 
philosophical inquiry, there are very few, if any, uncontroversial examples of successful analysis. 
However, attempts at conceptual analysis may be a valuable preliminary part of the related 
project of conceptual engineering. By exploring a wide range of cases, building theories, and 
                                                 
40 An anonymous reviewer suggested that Danks et al. (arguably) provide a procedure for probing such a concept 
experimentally. While space prevents an extended discussion of their experimental work, we do not believe their 
probes do this. Across three experiments they tested “ratings of causal strength” between what they consider to be 
moralized and non-moralized scenarios, finding no effect for moralization. While these experiments are couched as 
testing judgments about causal strength, the questions posed to participants instructed: “Respond with -100 [or -10] 
if you think that [factor] always [prevents outcome]. Respond with +100 [or +10] if you think that [factor] always 
[produces outcome]. And respond 0 if you think [factor] is irrelevant for [outcome].” Judgments concerning “causal 
strength” described in this way look rather different from the types of judgments that conceptual analysts have 
typically called on in investigating the ordinary concept of causation, including that these judgments would appear 
to be more closely related to structural causation than actual causation. As such, conceptual analysts would owe us 
an account of why “causal strength” judgments should be thought to better isolate the concept of interest and reasons 
to believe that the intuitions called on in the literature reflect ordinary judgments concerning “causal strength,” as 
well as evidence that such judgments abide by the compositionality constraint. 
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challenging them with counter-examples, would-be conceptual analysts provide a lot of material 
for developing conceptual tools to solve specific problems. Reflecting on patterns of ordinary 
causal attribution might be quite valuable to a conceptual engineer, but insofar as one is 
interested in building useful conceptual tools, one need not be constrained by them. Instead, 
conceptual engineers are constrained by the specific problems they face. But when we have 
specific problems in mind, our theories are constrained by measures of performance with respect 
to those problems. The clearest and most interesting example of this approach to actual causation 
that we know of is set out in Halpern (2016). 
 In addition to conceptual analysis and conceptual engineering, one might be interested in 
descriptive psychology. We take descriptive psychology to be a philosophical enterprise that 
may include conceptual analysis as a part but is typically broader in scope. For example, one 
might describe the cognitive processes leading from environmental stimuli to causal attributions 
without ever characterizing any concepts involved. A descriptive psychologist might doubt that 
humans have any concepts at all! The philosophical value of descriptive psychology is grounded 
in the project of understanding ourselves—our reasoning abilities, our language, and our forms 
of life. The studies described in this paper are obviously only a single thread in a great tapestry 
of such inquiry. We think that something like the FAD is a natural commitment in pursuing 
descriptive psychology. However, we also think that there are projects in descriptive psychology 
that need not endorse it. For example, one might be interested in what sorts of factors influence 
ordinary causal attributions without ever trying to produce a theory that predicts exactly what the 
attributions will be in any given case. 
 Finally, we consider the project of realist metaphysics. When thinking about the point of 
theorizing about actual causation, one might be tempted to say, “I’m trying to figure out what 
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causation is, of course!” The thought is that we study the causal relation in just the same way 
that we study electrons, temperature, or time. When we theorize about actual causation, we are 
theorizing about a relation in the world. Investigation proceeds by first fixing a target—perhaps 
by pointing to obvious examples—and then studying how that thing works. We may be surprised 
by what we learn about actual causation, just as we have been surprised by what we have learned 
about electrons, temperature, and time, and mature metaphysical theories of actual causation may 
turn out to be very different from our ordinary conception. Here, then, the FAD is reasonable 
only insofar as one is worried about having inadvertently changed the subject, as philosophers 
working on free will are sometimes accused of doing, or insofar as one antecedently thinks that 
ordinary causal attributions are likely to be correct.  
 Summing up, we have identified what we take to be a plausible constraint on descriptive 
theories of actual causation. We have provided evidence that ordinary causal attributions do not 
always satisfy the constraint. We then stepped back to observe that different philosophical 
projects are constrained by ordinary causal attributions to different degrees. We conclude with a 
bit of modest methodological advice. Philosophers can and should pursue multiple projects at 
once. But we should be clear about what our projects are and keep the constraints on our 
theorizing clearly in view. 
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